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Abstract: This paper studies a decentralized credit market where borrowers and lenders
engage in costly search to establish bilateral credit relationships. We endogenize the market
participation decision by borrowers to capture entry and exit of entrepreneurs who depend
on access to credit for survival. We allow incentive frictions in the form of moral hazard
to interact with search frictions in setting up incentive compatible optimal loan contracts.
We ﬁnd that entry and incentive frictions are important in determining the extent of credit
rationing, while search and incentive frictions are important for determining the likelihood
of credit market breakdown. We also show that the rate of time preference of lenders and the
duration of loan contracts are important factors in determining whether or not productive
ﬁrms are rationed.
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Time runs a close second to cash on every entrepreneur’s list of scarce re-
s o u r c e s .( W .E .W e t z e l ,J r . ,The Portable MBA in Entrepreneurship,p .1 8 5 )
Credit markets are capricious and susceptible to occasional breakdowns. Various expla-
nations for the turbulence in credit markets have been proposed largely based on theories
of informational imperfections.1 But these theories do not explain the phenomenon of
mismatches. Mismatches occur when idle funds coexist with proﬁtable but unexploited in-
v e s t m e n to p p o r t u n i t i e sa n da r ef o u n di nm o s t accounts of credit crises. The phenomenon
occurs partly because markets for information-intensive loans made to entrepreneurs tend
to be localized and satisfy many of the characteristics of a search market as originally pro-
posed by Stigler (1961).2 The extent of mismatch helps explain unfulﬁlled demand for
credit and the tightness of credit markets. Because access to credit is an important factor
for the survival of small entrepreneurs, mismatch ultimately helps determine credit market
participation and the likelihood of breakdown.
Information and matching frictions coexist even when credit markets are functioning
normally. Entrepreneurs, who exist in the ﬁnancial twilight zone between bankruptcy and
survival, are racing against time on the lookout for funds. Sometimes they qualify for
funding and sometimes they are rejected, but the search goes on until they ﬁnd funds or
else run out. On the other side of the market, lenders spend costly time and resources
looking to turn their idle funds into active investments. Part of the cost comes from
search and screening to identify potentially viable credit relationships. Once viable credit
partners have been identiﬁed, resources are used to negotiate contracts that are mutually
1In credit markets, imperfections arising from moral hazard and adverse selection problems have been
identiﬁed as a important factor leading to the rationing of credit and possible bank failures. There has been
an extensive literature following Diamond and Dybvig (1983) on bank runs (e.g., see Diamond and Rajan
(2001) and papers cited therein) as well as a broader literature on ﬁnancial fragility (e.g., see Allen and Gale
(2000) on ﬁnancial contagion and Lagunoﬀ and Schreft (2001) on instability of ﬁnancial networks).
2As Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1998) observe, where to ﬁnd funding is a paramount problem for existing
and would-be entrepreneurs. Hart and Moore (1994) provide another reason for mismatch not based on
search frictions but on the threat of debt repudiation.
1advantageous and incentive compatible. While the diﬀerence between normal and abnormal
credit market behavior is ﬂuid, at some point breakdown occurs and the market ceases to
exist at a local level or even at a national level. Because such breakdowns are associated
with potentially large social costs, it is important to understand this phenomenon and to
what extent informational and matching frictions reinforce one another.
In this paper we combine information, matching, and entry frictions in a simple general
equilibrium model of decentralized trade. Our analysis describes the optimal loan contracts
a n de q u i l i b r i at h a te m e r g ei ns u c ha ne n v i r o n m e n t . T h ei m p o r t a n tq u e s t i o no fw h e nc r e d i t
rationing arises and when markets break down is also investigated.
Our model has several features that are of interest. Borrowers and lenders choose
whether or not to participate in a decentralized loan market where search for bilateral credit
relationships is costly. Some participating borrowers and lenders form credit relationships
that enable borrowers to ﬁnance investment projects which yield a productive rate of return.
These returns are divided up between the borrower in the form of proﬁts and the lender in
the form of an interest payment. Because of incentive frictions that arise from asymmetric
information, borrowers may at a price abscond with the borrowed funds. Loan contracts
are hence negotiated to incorporate incentive compatibility to overcome the moral hazard
problem.3 Thus, credit rationing, in the sense of borrowers receiving fewer funds than
desired, may emerge endogenously.4 In equilibrium, optimal loan contracts and the extent of
credit rationing are determined jointly with market liquidity (or aggregate lending), borrower
market participation, and the tightness of the credit market (or the excess demand for loans
as measured by the ratio of unmatched borrowers to unmatched lenders).
Our perspective diﬀers in some signiﬁcant ways from previous work on bilateral search
in credit markets. Diamond (1992) is the original paper in the area and most closely
related to our work. We diverge along several dimensions and consider endogenous matching
probabilities and endogenous market participation. However, the most important innovation
is that we integrate information frictions into a search framework and thus allow for the
3See Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Acemoglu (2001) for other work on borrowers who abscond.
4Credit rationing here follows the notion of Jaﬀee and Russell (1976) rather than the notion of Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981), where observationally identical agents may or may not receive funds.
2possibility of endogenous rationing. Shi (1996) and Wasmer and Weil (2000) also analyze
search and credit but with an entirely diﬀerent purpose. While Shi is mainly interested in
how credit arrangements compare to monetary exchange, Wasmer and Weil are interested
in how credit market imperfections aﬀect labor market frictions. Neither of these papers
considers asymmetric information which is essential for understanding credit rationing.
We ﬁnd that the nature of the optimal incentive-compatible contract in equilibrium varies
with borrower productivity. If productivity falls below a threshold that is determined by
default costs, credit markets break down and cease to exist. If productivity exceeds this
threshold, ﬁrms will be rationed unless lenders are suﬃciently patient, in which case there is
no rationing. Even very productive ﬁrms may be rationed if the rate of time preference is
suﬃciently low or the length of the loan contract period is suﬃciently short. Intuitively, a
low rate of time preference raises the present discounted value of absconding with borrowed
funds and a short contract duration lowers the value of the match for a borrower who must
search again in the credit market. Also, we ﬁnd that credit market tightness and the
extent of credit rationing are positively related when entry is exogenous. But when entry
is endogenous, there generally does not exist a monotonic relationship between the two.
Intuitively, credit may continue to be rationed in a market where it is relatively easy for
borrowers to locate lenders because high market interest rates drive productive ﬁrms out of
the loanable funds market. Finally, we show that entry and incentive frictions are important
in determining the extent of credit rationing, while entry and search frictions are important
for determining the likelihood of credit market breakdown.
2 The Basic Environment
Time is continuous. There are two types of economic agents, those endowed with resources
(“lenders”) and those endowed with an “investment” technology which uses those resources
to generate a positive return (“borrowers”). Our model focuses on the loanable funds market
where available funds provided by a continuum of lenders are channeled to a continuum of
potential borrowers through a decentralized credit market. Let NL and NB represent
3the mass of lenders and borrowers in this environment. For convenience, we normalize the
measure of lenders to unity. Lenders and borrowers (bilaterally) meet with each other for the
purpose of establishing a credit relationship. We deﬁne Ni
u to be the number of unmatched
agents and Ni
m as the number of matched agents of type i where i = L,B. By normalizing
the mass of lenders to unity, we have: NL
u + NL
m = 1. A central feature of the loan market
highlighted by our model is that market liquidi t yi sd e t e r m i n e db yc r e d i tm a r k e tt i g h t n e s s .
Given the populations of lenders and borrowers, a measure of credit market tightness in
our set-up is given by the ratio of unmatched lenders to unmatched borrowers, or NB
u /N L
u .
Intuitively, if this ratio is high, then there are many potential borrowers relative to lenders
with idle funds. Because it is more diﬃcult for borrowers to locate potential lenders under
these circumstances, we say that the credit market is “tight.”
Utility generated from consumption is assumed to be linear for both types of agents.
Since the focus of this paper is on how credit market frictions and market liquidity aﬀect
credit arrangements between borrowers and lenders rather than the intertemporal consump-
tion and saving decisions of households, this simplifying assumption is adopted without loss
of generality for our purpose. An unmatched lender consumes his ﬂow endowment ω as
he searches for borrowers with whom to trade this endowment for the promise of a future
payment. A borrower begins the search period with only his investment technology and
searches for potential lenders to ﬁnance their project. Lenders contact borrowers at a rate
of µ, while borrowers contact lenders at a rate of η. Due to asymmetric information about
the borrower’s behavior, the lender is unsure about whether the borrower will invest in a
productive project or take the money and run. Thus, once a borrower and a lender meet, the
lender will set an incentive compatible loan contract to prevent the borrower from abscond-
ing with the funds. The contract speciﬁes a gross interest payment, R, and the fraction of
available funds actually lent out, q ≤ 1. When this loan contract is established, the lender
g i v e su pap o r t i o no ft h ee n d o w m e n t ,qω, to the borrower and consumes the residual portion
(1 − q)ω while waiting for the end of the contract period. The contract period ends when
borrowers and lenders are separated at which time the lender pays the borrower an amount
Rqω. The exogenous separation rate is given by δ, and hence the length of the contract
4period is given by 1/δ and the appropriate gross interest rate is given by δR.A f t e r b o t h
members of the match become separated, they re-enter the pool of unmatched borrowers
and lenders and again search for credit opportunities.
If borrowers in this model know with certainty that the loan will be repaid, our preferences
imply that it will be optimal for the lender to set q = 1 and lend all of the endowment to the
borrower in exchange for the future payment. However, borrowers in our model may choose
to default on the loan and abscond without repayment. When this occurs, the defaulter
bears two costs. First, we assume that the defaulter is excluded from any future credit
transactions. Second, we assume that the borrow e rm u s tf o r f e i tar e a lr e s o u r c ec o s tt h a ti s
measured as a fraction θ of total loanable funds. This cost is meant to capture the outside
penalty of default and may represent legal or institutional features. A natural interpretation
is the cost of bankruptcy where the creditor has no claims on the residual portion of the loan.
This moral hazard feature is what may cause loanable funds to be rationed (i.e., q<1).
That is, lenders will use this quantity rationing feature of the loan contract so as to insure
incentive compatibility and repayment.
We can now characterize the dynamic problem facing borrowers and lenders in our econ-
omy. Let Ju and Jm denote the lender’s value associated with being in the unmatched (u)
and matched (m) states. These asset values can be expressed as:
rJu = ω + µ(Jm − Ju)( 1 )
rJm =( 1− q)ω + δ[Rqω +( Ju − Jm)] (2)
where r>0 is the rate of time preference. Equation (1) says that the ﬂow value associated
with an unmatched lender is the ﬂow of consumption from his endowment and arrival rate
of borrowers times the net value gained when a loan contract is implemented and the match
is formed. Equation (2) says that the ﬂow value associated with a matched lender is the
ﬂow of consumption of the residual endowment and the rate at which the contract expires
times the interest payment and net value of returning to the unmatched pool.
Similarly, let Πu and Πm denote the borrowers’s value associated with being in the un-
5matched and matched states, respectively. Their asset values in the two states are:
rΠu = η(Πm − Πu)( 3 )
rΠm = Aqω + δ[−Rqω +( Πu − Πm)] (4)
Equation (3) simply states that the ﬂow value associated with an unmatched borrower is the
rate at which they contact lenders times the net value gained when becoming matched with
a lender. Equation (4) says that the ﬂow value associated with a matched borrower is the
stream of returns the borrower obtains from implementing the investment project and the
value associated with separation which occurs at rate δ. When this occurs, the borrower
makes the interest payment Rqω, gains the state of returning to the unmatched borrowers’
pool, and looses the state of being a matched borrower.5
Subtracting (1) from (2) gives us the lenders’ value of being matched relative to being
unmatched as:
Jm − Ju =
(δR − 1)qω
r + δ + µ
(5)
Notice that equation (5) implies that a necessary condition for an active loan market requires
Jm − Ju > 0o rδR>1. Otherwise, the economy will degenerate into an autarchic state
where no credit activity occurs. We will assume that this condition holds.
Similarly, subtracting (3) from (4) gives us the borrowers’ value of being matched relative
to being unmatched as:
Πm − Πu =
(A − δR)qω
r + δ + η
(6)
We note that The relative values given by (5) and (6) are aggregate expressions. However,
each individual borrower is atomistic and take their unmatched value Πu as given when
evaluating their matched value. We take this into account and rewrite (4) gives,
Πm =
(A − δR)qω + δΠu
r + δ
(7)
5F o rs i m p l i c i t yw eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tb o r r o w e r sd on o th a v ea n ya s s e t s . M o r eg e n e r a l l y ,i fb o r r o w e r s
also have an asset ωB, equation (3) must be modiﬁed to rΠu = ωB+η(Πm − Πu). If these assets are jointly
productive with the endowment of the lender then equation (4) changes to rΠm = A(qω +ωB)+δ[−Rqω +
(Πu − Πm)]. Another possibility (that is also beyond the scope of this paper) is that borrower’s assets
could be used as collateral for loans. For a discussion of these and related issues see, for instance, Bernanke
and Gertler (1989) and Hart and Moore (1994).
6In the presence of the moral hazard problem, a loan contract must be incentive compat-
ible to eliminate borrowers’ default in equilibrium. Speciﬁcally in our framework, incentive
compatibility means that the value associated with being a matched ﬁrm must be at least





where the left hand side of (8) gives the present discounted value of absconding as the
discounted value of the funds borrowed net of the cost expressed as a fraction θ of the loan.6






) − (A − δR)
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≤ δΠu (9)
From (9) we see that an increase in the loan interest rate δR or an increase in the total
quantity of the loan qω increases the likelihood of absconding. An incentive compatible
loan contract is deﬁned as a pair (q,R) such that (9) is satisﬁed.
When borrowers and lenders meet, they bargain over the terms of the contract. We will
assume that the outcome of this bargaining game is consistent with the Nash bargaining
solution where the contract (q,R) is designed to maximize the joint surplus of the funds
suppliers and demanders S =( Jm−Ju)1/2(Πm−Πu)1/2, subject to the incentive compatibility
constraint (9) and q ∈ [0,1]. Using (5) and (7), maximization of the joint surplus implies
dS
dq > 0a n d ,f r o mdS
dR =0 ,
δRqω =( Aqω − rΠu)Γ +( 1− Γ)( 1 0 )
where Γ ≡
r+δ+µ
2(r+δ)+µ is monotone increasing function of µ. Notice that if the pair (q,R)i sn o t
incentive constrained (that is, the incentive compatibility constraint is not binding), then
an optimal loan contract will always involve the lender loaning out his entire endowment or
q =1 . 7
6So far we have assumed, like Diamond (1990), that the penalty for defaulting is exclusion from the credit
market forever. Perhaps this assumption is too harsh in light of modern bankruptcy laws. If instead credit
market participation is allowed after payment of the default penalty, the incentive compatibility constraint
becomes (1 − θ)
qω
r + Πu ≤ Πm. One can easily verify that most of our qualitative results in the following
sections are unchanged, even though the IC locus is now upward-sloping, δR ≤ B − rΠu
Q .
7Suppose instead we assume that production is ﬁnalized after separation (not before as assumed in (4)).
73 Characterization of the Loan Contract
We proceed by describing the optimal loan contract in the presence of incentive frictions
that cause a moral hazard problem. The optimal contract must be incentive compatible
and satisfy the Nash bargaining condition. Both conditions can be represented in an intuitive
graphical fashion.
Formally, an optimal loan contract is a pair (R,q) such that (i) q =1a n dR solves (10)
if this pair satisﬁes (9), or otherwise (ii) q<1a n dR solves (10) and (9) with equality.
We deﬁne this latter case as a situation where the optimal loan contract is characterized
by credit rationing. For analytic convenience, deﬁne Q ≡ qω. Thus, one can express the







Γ +( 1− Γ)( 1 1 )




where B ≡ A − (1 − θ)r+δ
r .
The determination of the optimal incentive compatible loan contract can be accomplished
graphically in (Q,δR) space with the origin deﬁned as Q =0a n dδR = 1. We construct
the graph in three steps.
First, we plot the surplus maximization condition (11) and call it the SM locus. This
locus is upward-sloping and concave with a horizontal intercept QSM = rΠu
A−1 and slope ΓrΠu
Q2 .
An optimal loan contract must be along this SM locus. The slope of the SM locus can be
interpreted in terms of the bargaining power of borrowers versus lenders. For example, a
steep SM curve, resulting from a faster arrival rate of borrowers, µ, or long loan contract
period, low δ, increases the bargaining power of lenders. Hence they can demand a higher
interest rate (δR) for a given increase in the loan quantity Q and this implies a steeper SM
locus.
In this case (4) changes to rΠm = δ[(A − R)qω +( Πu − Πm)]. Ultimately, this means that (10) simpliﬁes
to δRqω =
(δA−1)qω−rΠu
2 . While we do not persue this simpliﬁcation here, it should be noted that the
Nash bargaining condition becomes independent of µ under this new timing assumption. In turn, the loan
contract becomes independent of loan market tightness.
8Second, we plot the incentive compatibility condition (12) with equality in (Q,δR)s p a c e
and call it the IC locus. This locus is downward-sloping and convex to the origin such that
limQ−→0 δR = ∞ and limQ−→∞ δR = B and has slope −δΠu
Q2 .A l s o , f o r B<1, IC has a
horizontal intercept at QIC = δΠu
1−B.A n y ( Q,δR) in the area below the IC locus satisﬁes the
incentive compatibility constraint.
Third is the property that an optimal loan contract must always have q as large as
possible within the feasible range [0,1]. Formally, we can plot Q = ω as the upper bound
for q. This means that if an optimal loan contract exists, it must be on the part of the SM
locus that is to the right of the IC locus and to the left of the Q = ω locus with the highest
q. The existence of an active loanable funds market for all δR>1 requires the condition
that A>1 and this is satisﬁed for a suﬃciently productive economy.
Figure 1 segments our characterization of the optimal loan contract into three cases,
depending on the relative position of the SM and IC loci. Case I indicates a situation when
the SM locus is everywhere below IC. Hence all combinations of (Q,δR)a l o n gt h eS Ml o c u s
are incentive compatible and the optimal loan contract is the one with the highest value of
q, implying Q∗ = ω and the absence of credit rationing (see point E).
When the IC locus crosses the SM locus as in Case II, the amount of funds available in the
economy is central for characterizing the optimal incentive compatible loan contract. When
the amount of funds available is low (say, ω = ωL), the optimal loan contract represented
by (QL,δRL)i sa tp o i n tEL where credit rationing is absent (i.e., q = 1). However, when
the amount of funds available is high with ω = ωH, the incentive compatibility constraint
is now binding. As a consequence, there will be a unique optimal loan contract represented
by (QH,δRH). In this case credit rationing emerges because the highest q attainable is
strictly less than one (see point EH where QH < ωH). Intuitively, loaning out a higher
quantity of available funds increases the incentives for the borrower to abscond and leads
to a binding incentive compatibility constraint. Since credit rationing only occurs when
the endowment is suﬃciently high and no rationing occurs otherwise, we will call this the
“conditional (credit rationing) equilibrium.”8
8Other assumptions may change the size of the credit rationing region. For example, allowing the
9Finally, Case III shows that if the IC locus crosses the horizontal axis at a point lower
than SM, there exists no incentive compatible combination of (Q,δR) and no equilibrium
loan contract. This is the “non-active” credit market outcome and is comparable to a credit
market breakdown. After completely characterizing the steady state equilibrium, we will
return to a more detailed analysis of the conditions consistent with each of these possible
equilibrium outcomes.
4 Loanable Funds Equilibrium
The previous section discussed the properties of incentive compatible optimal loan contracts
given the rates by which borrowers and lenders are matched. We now close the model by
characterizing the steady state process by which lenders and borrowers meet. This will in
turn pin down the equilibrium contact rates by which agents are matched, the steady state
population of matched and unmatched borrowers and lenders, and hence equilibrium credit
market tightness.
The ﬂow of lenders into the state of being matched is given by µNL
u and the ﬂow of bor-
rowers into the matched state is given by ηNB
u . In a steady-state loanable funds equilibrium,









u )( 1 3 )
where the matching technology M that brings borrowers and lenders together is strictly
increasing and concave, satisfying the constant-returns-to-scale property, the standard Inada
conditions, and the boundary conditions M(0,·)=M(·,0) = 0.




u .W h e n τ is high, it is
borrower to use the loanable funds to produce before absconding means that the incentive compatibility
condition changes from (8) to (1−θ)
Aqω
r ≤ Πm. Equation (12) is the same except for B∗ = A[1−(1−θ)r+δ
r ] <
B. This implies that the IC locus is everywhere below the original IC curve derived above. Hence, the set
of incentive compatible contracts shrinks and credit rationing becomes more likely. This situation allows
borrowers to divert assets and returns rather than only the productive assets. The circumstances in Hart
and Moore (1998) where borrowers can only divert the returns to the project is captured in a related incentive
compatibility condition where (1 − θ)
(A−1)qω
r ≤ Πm.
10relatively diﬃcult for borrowers to locate lenders and the market is tight.9 With these
properties, we can rewrite the steady state condition in terms of our tightness measure:
µ = ητ= m0M(1,τ)( 1 4 )





is decreasing in τ;m o r e o v e r ,b o t hµ and η are increasing in m0,
µ
η = τ (independent of
m0), limτ→0 µ(τ)=0a n dl i m τ→∞ η(τ) = 0. This relationship is often referred to as the
Beveridge curve in the search equilibrium literature. For labor markets the curve relates the
unemployment rate to the vacancy rate (or establishes a relationship between the associated
ﬂow contact rates), while for credit markets we relate the capital unemployment rate to a
measure of how much idle funds there are in the system.








There is a large mass of potential borrowers. Borrower entry into the loan market is
determined by assuming each borrower faces a ﬁxed cost v for setting up the investment
technology. By equilibrium entry, borrowers enter into the unmatched pool of borrowers
until their unmatched value is driven down to the entry cost, or,
Πu = v (17)
Using the Beveridge curve relationship, we can substitute (16) into (17) to yield:
η(τ)
r + δ + η(τ)
(AQ − δRQ)=rv (18)
9This is the most convenient way to measure tightness in our model. An alternative measure is the ratio
of unmatched to total borrowers in the market
NB
u
NB. Since this measure is proportional to τ (see Appendix),
our measure is without loss of generality.












This is referred to as the ex ante zero proﬁt curve (ZP), which is strictly increasing and
strictly concave in (Q,τ) space with a horizontal intercept rv
A−1.10
A loanable funds equilibrium with ﬁrm entry is therefore a triplet (Q∗,δR∗,τ∗)t h a t
satisﬁes the optimal incentive compatible loan contract (11) and (12) as speciﬁed in the
previous section, (17) and the ZP condition given by (19). Figure 2 provides an illustration
of this steady state equilibrium by combining Case II from Figure 1 in the top panel with
the ZP locus in the bottom panel (whereby we note that this locus has the same horizontal
intercept as the SM locus). Thus, a loanable funds equilibrium is determined in a recursive
manner. The optimal incentive compatible contract pins down the equilibrium (Q∗,δR∗).
Then the ZP locus determines equilibrium entry and hence the market tightness measure τ∗
that is consistent with the optimal contract.
Once this triplet is determined, it is straightforward to derive the steady state populations
of matched and unmatched borrowers and lenders. From (15) and (14), we have η∗ and
µ∗, respectively. Because the inﬂow of unmatched lenders being matched must equal the
outﬂow of matched lenders being separated: µ∗NL
u = δNL
m. Substituting the population
identity, NL
u + NL











δ + µ∗ (20)
From this it is easy to see that the equilibrium number of unmatched borrowers is NB∗
u =
τ∗NL∗
u . It is straightforward to verify that when a loanable funds equilibrium exists, it
is unique. Hence, in general, not only does the optimal loan contract determine market
tightness and liquidity, but market tightness in turn also aﬀects the optimal loan contract.
10As u ﬃcient condition for the concavity of the ZP locus is given by the envelope condition
(1/τ)MHH
MH > −2.
For example, this is trivially satisﬁed for the Cobb-Douglas case.
125 Equilibrium Analysis
We now analyze the properties of the steady state loanable funds equilibrium. We identify
the conditions that are consistent with existence of the steady state and show that we can
diﬀerentiate between three possible regimes. Speciﬁcally, based on the equations underlying
Figure 2, we have:
Proposition 1. (Characterization of the Optimal Loan Contract). We establish the follow-
ing properties regarding the possible loanable funds equilibrium outcomes:
(i) If (A − 1) < (1 − θ), then there does not exist an incentive compatible loan contract
and the loan market is non-active (Case III).
(ii) If (1 − θ) ≤ (A − 1) < 2(1 − θ)a n dω is suﬃciently high, then there exists a credit
rationing equilibrium where q<1( C a s eI I ) .
(iii) Let r =
(1−θ)[2δ+µ]
(A−1)−2(1−θ).I f 2 ( 1 −θ) < (A−1) and ω is suﬃciently high, then r<r implies
that there exists a credit rationing equilibrium where q<1( C a s eI I )a n dr ≥ r implies
that the incentive compatibility constraint never binds the equilibrium loan contract
(Case I).
Proof: See Appendix. ¤
Proposition 1 outlines the region of the parameter space consistent with the various
possible equilibrium outcomes discussed in the previous section. This Proposition has a very
intuitive interpretation. Loosely, if the productivity of the investment project is suﬃciently
low relative to the incentive friction, then there will always the incentive incentive to abscond
for any loan contract along the SM locus. In this case (Case III), there is no active loanable
funds equilibrium and the loan market “fails” to function. Once productivity begins to
exceed a threshold level (Case II), lenders begin channeling loanable funds to borrowers, but
the quantity is rationed. Finally, if productivity is suﬃciently high, then whether or not
there is rationing can be expressed in terms of the rate of time preference. In particular, if the
13rate of time preference is suﬃciently small, then the present discounted value of consumption
generated from absconding for the borrower becomes greater than the value of being matched
in the loanable funds market. Lenders must continue to ration loans so that the incentive
compatibility binds (Case II). If, on the other hand, the rate of time preference is very
large, there will never be an incentive for the borrower to abscond and all loan contracts are
incentive compatible (Case I).
Proposition 1 establishes that credit rationing of productive ﬁrms depends on a threshold
r. Next, we consider the underlying changes to this threshold that make credit rationing of
productive ﬁrms more likely.
Proposition 2. (Credit Rationing). Given a suﬃcient productivity of the investment
project [(A − 1) > 2(1 − θ)],
(i) An exogenous increase in market tightness (τ) increases the likelihood of credit ra-
tioning. For all r>0, there exists τ < ∞ suﬃciently large such that equilibrium
credit rationing will occur.
(ii) An increase in the loan contract period (duration), or decrease in δ,l e a d st oa ni n -
crease in the set of incentive compatible contracts and an increase in the loan market
equilibrium interest rate. If the latter eﬀect dominates the former, credit rationing is
likely to occur.
Proof:
(i) The proof follows directly from Proposition 1. From (14) an (exogenous) increase
in τ increases the frequency at which lenders meet borrowers, µ.S i n c e ∂r
∂µ > 0i t
follows that an increase in market tightness expands the set of feasible rates of time
preference consistent with the credit rationing equilibrium. As τ becomes arbitrarily
large, r →∞.
(ii) This follows directly from the observation that limQ→∞ δRSM and limQ→∞δRIC are
decreasing in δ. ¤
14To see the intuition behind this result, suppose that the initial steady state equilibrium
is given by Case I. In this case, every loan contract that maximizes the joint match surplus
of borrowers and lenders is incentive compatible. The Beveridge curve relationship given
by (14) implies that an increase in market tightness increases the rate that lenders contact
borrowers. This increases the threat point and bargaining power of lenders when negotiating
the loan contract. As a result, the SM locus shifts upwards and this reduces the set of Q and
δR combinations consistent with incentive compatibility. If the increase in market tightness
is suﬃciently large, IC will eventually intersect with the SM locus and credit will begin to
be rationed at a higher equilibrium interest rate. Thus, we are more likely to see credit
rationed in situations where the lack of liquidity in the credit market makes it diﬃcult for
borrowers to ﬁnd loan opportunities.
A longer contract period (low δ) increases the set of incentive compatible contracts since
the borrower can enjoy the productive beneﬁts supported by the loanable funds for a greater
p e r i o do ft i m e . T h i si sc a p t u r e db ya nu p w a r ds h i f to ft h eI Cl o c u s . H o w e v e r ,al o n g e r
contract period also makes the match more valuable to the borrower and biases the bargaining
power towards lenders. Consequently, the SM locus shifts upwards as well. In Case II, the
market equilibrium loan rate increases in both the case where there is no rationing (ω=ωL)
and when there is rationing (ω=ωH). Whether or not credit rationing is more likely depends
upon whether the bargaining eﬀect dominates the incentive compatibility eﬀect. If so, then
the a longer contract period both increases rationing and the equilibrium loan rate.
Proposition 2 showed that an exogenous increase in the tightness of the credit market
will eventually lead to credit rationing. However, because entry decisions of borrowers are
endogenized in general equilibrium, this may no longer be the case. In particular, we ﬁnd
Proposition 3.( Market Tightness vs. Credit Rationing) There is no necessary positive
relationship between credit market tightness and the extent of credit rationing in general
equilibrium.
To illustrate this proposition, consider the following comparative steady state analysis
of an increase in funds matching eﬃcacy (m0) that improves matching for both lenders and
15borrowers in Case II. This is illustrated in Figure 3. Under our funds matching framework,
ar i s eo fm0 raises the eﬀective contact rate of funds suppliers Γ and strengthens their
bargaining power. As a consequence, joint surplus maximization grants relatively higher
returns to the suppliers, implying an increase in R for each given value Q.T h a ti s ,t h eS M
locus rotates upwards. From the ZP relationship, an increase in mo will raise the matching
rate η(τ) of borrowers. For a given Q determined by the optimal loan contract, more potential
borrowers enter and hence the loan market becomes tighter. That is, the ZP locus twists
toward the vertical axis.
For the case of ω = ωL where the incentive compatibility constraint is not binding, the
equilibrium loan rate rises as the market participation (or tightness) increases. For the case
of ω = ωH, rationing increases in response to the increased entry of potential borrowers and
a higher equilibrium loan rate is required to satisfy incentive compatibility. However, the
increased severity of credit rationing reduces potential borrowers’ expected proﬁt, thereby
decreasing their entry. Due to this latter opposing eﬀect, the net change in the tightness
of the loan market is ambiguous. Hence, an observed increase in credit rationing need not
imply increased tightness in the credit market.
6 The Role of Market Frictions
We next explicitly consider the impact of search frictions (ﬁnite m0), market entry frictions
(v), and incentive frictions (θ) on the structure of optimal lending arrangements and steady
state equilibrium in the loanable funds market. Each of these frictions is considered sepa-
rately so that their relative contributions to explaining credit rationing and market failure
c a nb ei s o l a t e da n da n a l y z e d .
6.1 Search Frictions
Without search frictions, credit market participants do not have to wait to set up a credit
arrangement. In this case, we have
Proposition 4. (Search Frictions). In the absence of search frictions, the equilibrium
16loan contract and the existence of equilibrium credit rationing are independent of market
tightness.
Proof: The absence of search frictions occurs in the limiting case where m0 −→ ∞.T h e
Beveridge curve relation implies that while µ and η −→ ∞, τ ≡ µ/η will remain bounded
by the constant returns to scale property of the matching technology. Using these and
limm0−→∞ Γ = 1, the steady state equilibrium conditions (11), (12), and (19) are now given
by δR = A− rv
Q, δR ≤ B + δv
Q,a n dQ = rv
A−1(1+τ), respectively. Since τ no longer appears
in the SM and IC loci, the optimal loan contract is independent of market thickness. ¤
This result says that search frictions are crucial for a linkage between market tightness,
the optimal loan contract, and credit rationing. If borrowers and lenders can meet and
enter into a lending agreement instantaneously, their relative bargaining position will not be
aﬀected by the tightness of the market. In this situation the only equilibrium outcomes are
the conditional (Case II) and non-active (Case III) steady states. Because of the entry costs
on the borrower’s side, a reduction in search frictions increases the relative ease with which
lenders locate borrowers. As in Proposition 2, this causes an upward shift in the SM locus.
As the loan equilibrium interest rate rises, lenders must ration in order to keep the contract
incentive compatible. The absence of search frictions in general equilibrium can be seen as
a limiting case of this sequence of partial equilibrium events.
6.2 Entry Frictions
Here we consider costless entry of borrowers into the credit market. Under these circum-
stances, the demand for funds is perfectly elastic and we establish
Proposition 5. (Entry Frictions). In the absence of entry frictions, there does not exist
a credit rationing equilibrium. Equilibrium in the loan market is characterized by either an
active no rationing loanable funds market or a non-active loan market.
Proof: The absence of ﬁrm entry frictions occurs in the limiting case where v → 0. Since
there is now unrestricted borrower entry, the steady state conditions described (11), (12) are
now given by δR = Γ(A − 1) + 1, δR ≤ B. Existence of an active loanable funds market
17requires Γ(A−1)+1 <B= A−(1−θ)(r+δ
r ). Satisfaction of this condition implies that all
combinations of (Q,δR) along the (horizontal) SM locus is incentive compatible and there
is no credit rationing, q =1 . ¤
To obtain intuition behind this result, suppose that the initial steady state equilibrium
is given by the active no rationing equilibrium of Case I. In this situation, B>Γ(A −
1) + 1. Lower entry frictions encourages the entry of borrowers and this drives down their
unmatched value. This rotates the SM locus clockwise as lenders take advantage of their
increased bargaining power. At the same time, a lower unmatched value for the borrower
must be compensated by a decrease in the loan rate or loan quantity to maintain incentive
compatibility. In the limiting case as these costs vanish, no contract that oﬀers an interest
rate above B will be incentive compatible and no interest rate above Γ(A − 1) + 1 will be
consistent with the optimal loan contract. Hence, there will only be an active no rationing
equilibrium.
Alternatively, suppose that the initial steady state equilibrium is given by the conditional
equilibrium of Case II. In this situation, B<Γ(A − 1) + 1. Lower entry frictions encour-
ages the entry of borrowers and this drives down their unmatched value. As lenders take
advantage of their increased bargaining power, the interest rate consistent with the optimal
loan contract rises and the SM locus rotates clockwise. In the limiting case as entry costs
vanish, the interest rate approaches its maximum value given by Γ(A − 1) + 1. At the
same time, a lower unmatched value for the borrower must be compensated by a decrease in
t h el o a nr a t eo rl o a nq u a n t i t yt om a i n t a i ni n c e n t i v ec o m p a t i b i l i t ya n dt h i si sc a p t u r e db ya
counterclockwise rotation of the IC locus. In the limiting case as these entry costs vanish,
no contract that oﬀers an interest rate above B will be incentive compatible. Hence, as no
optimal loan contract will be incentive compatible, the credit market fails to function there
will only be a non-active equilibrium.
Furthermore, recall that Case I captures an active loan market equilibrium with no
credit rationing only if the potential supply of loanable funds (ω)i ss u ﬃciently large. If
ω is small then there may not be any positive rate of interest consistent with the optimal
18loan contract. However, as entry costs for borrowers are driven to zero, there will emerge
an active non-rationing credit market equilibrium. If, on the other hand, the economy
was initially characterized by the conditional Case II, possibly with credit rationing, then a
removal of entry barriers will lead to a breakdown of the credit market and non-existence.
6.3 Incentive Frictions
Finally, we investigate the role of moral hazard for credit arrangements in the decentralized
market. We detail how the equilibrium is aﬀected if the cost of absconding is driven down
to zero.
Proposition 6. (Incentive Frictions). In the absence of incentive frictions, there only exists
an active, no rationing loanable funds market equilibrium.
Proof: The absence of incentive frictions corresponds to the limiting case where the costs of
absconding as a fraction of total funds, θ → 1. It is immediate from Proposition 1 that for
any given A>1, we can rule out (i) the non-active equilibrium and (ii) the credit rationing
equilibrium with (A − 1) ∈ (1 − θ,2(1 − θ)) = ∅.I n t h e c a s e w h e r e ( A − 1) > 2(1 − θ),
r =
(1−θ)[2δ+µ]
(A−1)−2(1−θ) =0 . H e n c e ,a l lr>0s a t i s ﬁes r>r and in this case there exists the active,
no rationing equilibrium. ¤
Proposition 5 says that the moral hazard problem arising from incentive frictions is crucial
in explaining the existence of both credit rationing and credit market failure. In the presence
of these incentive frictions, search frictions provide a link between market liquidity and credit
market tightness and credit rationing. Finally, borrower entry frictions also play a crucial
role in explaining credit rationing. While the absence of such frictions do not preclude the
non-active equilibrium, it does rule out credit rationing as an equilibrium outcome.
7 D u r a t i o no fL o a nC o n t r a c t s
An innovative aspect of this our search model of the credit market is that it incorporates
(exogenously) a variable capturing the duration of the loan contract. This was denoted by δ
19(where 1
δ corresponds to the length of the loan period). For example, in the previous section
we discussed how an increase in the period of the loan contract can aﬀect the incentive
compatibility, the interest rate oﬀer, and the possibility of credit rationing. An interesting
application of this framework would be to study how the period of the loan contract aﬀects
the interest rate oﬀer and vice versa. A simple illustration of this would be to consider the
case of the active equilibrium with no credit rationing (Case I). Here, the optimal contract
interest rate is just given by substituting Q∗ = ω into (11) to get:
δR
∗ =[ A −
rv
ω
]Γ +( 1− Γ)( 2 1 )
Notice that as long as (A−1) > rv
ω ,w h i c hi ss a t i s ﬁed if the supply of loanable funds ω or the
productivity of the investment project A is suﬃciently large. In this case a decrease in δ,o r
increase in the length of the loan contract, increases Γ and hence the optimal loan interest
rate δR∗. One could interpret this as an upward sloping yield curve in (1
δ,δR) space. While
beyond the focus of this paper, it would be of interest in future work to more completely
analyze the term structure properties of a search model of credit.
A related issue would be to extend our model to address the endogenous joint deter-
mination of the quantity, loan rate, and loan contracting period. One way to approach
pinning down (Q,δR,δ) is to have all three objects be the outcome of decentralized bilateral
bargaining between lenders and borrowers. In other words, have them be a solution to a






s.t. Jm − Ju =
(1 − q)ω + δRqω − rJu
r + δ
and Πm − Πu =
(A − δR)qω − rΠu
r + δ
In addition to the bargaining condition for δR given in (11), we now have an additional ﬁrst













Because the expression in brackets is equal to zero (Jm − Ju = Πm − Πu), this implies an
optimal choice of δ∗ →∞ . That is, instantaneous credit transactions and separations
20maximize the joint surplus of a borrower-lender pair when production is instantaneous at
the time of a match. This result delivers an important message. In our admittedly highly
stylized framework, where long-term relationships only lower search costs but do not alter
incentive frictions, there exists no reason to continue a credit relationship. This is because
the marginal gain in matched values from continuing a relationship is dominated by the
marginal loss in unmatched values (via the bargaining threat points). Undoubtedly, adding
more realistic features to the model will provide additional incentive to prolonging credit
relationships. For instance, allowing learning and diminishing incentive frictions over the
time agents are matched may yield outcomes that favor long-term relationships. Although
it is beyond the scope of the current paper to go further along this path, we would like to
point out that there is an active literature exploring long-term credit relationships.11
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper has presented a simple search-theoretic model of the credit market. The model
features endogenous entry and moral hazard because they are particularly important factors
in determining the fortunes of entrepreneurs. Our analysis describes the optimal incentive
compatible loan contracts and equilibria that emerge in such an environment. While we
tie the extent of mismatch to the tightness of credit markets, we ﬁnd that mismatch and
tightness are somewhat of a “red-herring” for understanding the extent of credit rationing.
This is because endogenous entry severs any relationship between credit market tightness
and credit rationing. We also show that entry and incentive frictions are important factors
for determining when credit markets breakdown. In other words, the ease of entry into
the credit market and the ease of exit from the credit market (via default) are important
for market breakdown. This suggests that understanding the boundaries of the market is
fundamental for understanding credit market breakdown. Finally, we show that search and
incentive frictions are important for determining the extent of credit rationing. In other
words, it is the ease of ﬁnding a credit partner and the ease of undoing a partnership that are
11 For instance, Hart and Moore (1998) investigate mechanisms and incentives to renegotiate debt contracts
i nt h ef a c eo fc r e d i tm a r k e ti m p e r f e c t i o n sa n fi n c o m p l e t ec o n t r a c t i n g .
21important for rationing. This suggests that understanding the boundaries of a relationship
is fundamental for understanding rationing. We believe that our simple framework will be
a useful vehicle for further investigation into these boundary issues.
There are several other possibilities for future work. First, it would be interesting
to reexamine the optimal loan contract and the likelihood of market breakdowns under
alternative setups of the moral hazard problem. In passing we have identiﬁed several
possibilities that are of general interest. In particular, one may allow the borrower to use
the loanable funds to produce before absconding or permit the absconder to participate
in the loan market after paying for the penalty of bankruptcy. Moreover, following Hart
and Moore (1994 and 1998), one could contrast the situation where the lender can divert
project returns only to the situation where part of the underlying assets can be diverted.
In any case, the incentive compatibility constraint must be modiﬁed, which may lead to
diﬀerent equilibrium outcomes. Second, one might argue there is too much randomness
in our matching model and that this randomness exaggerates the moral hazard problem
and diminishes the beneﬁt of long-term relationships. One way to address this issue is
to adopt the directed-search price-posting game developed by Peters (1991). Speciﬁcally,
there are two segregated submarkets: one similar to the environment in the present paper
and one with lenders requiring full credit documentation (that presumably minimizes the
incentive frictions). Since all borrowers are identical ex ante,e a c hl e n d e ri ne a c hs e g r e g a t e d
submarket posts for all borrowers the ﬂow interest rate and the duration of the loan contract
to maximize the expected value subject to a no-arbitrage condition that ensures all borrowers
receive equal value ex ante. As a consequence, the loan contracts are generally diﬀerent
between the two submarkets, and free mobility of borrowers results in diﬀerent matching
probabilities and hence diﬀerent measures of tightness within the two credit markets.
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Proof to Proposition 1
(i) Consider the case where (A−1) < (1−θ). This implies that B ≡ A−(1−θ)(r+δ
r ) < 1
so that the IC locus has a horizontal intercept at QIC = δΠu
1−B. Suppose there exists
an active loanable funds equilibrium. This implies:
δΠu
1 − B
= QIC <Q SM =
rΠu
A − 1
or, r(1 − B) < δ(A − 1)
or, r[(1 − θ) − (A − 1)] < δ[(A − 1) − (1 − θ)] (A1)
since the right hand side of this expression is negative while the left-hand side is
positive, we have a contradiction. Hence, no active loanable funds equilibrium exists.
(Case III)
(ii) Consider the case where (1 − θ) ≤ (A − 1) ≤ 2(1 − θ). From the SM locus given by
(11) notice that limQ→∞ δRSM = Γ(A − 1) + 1. Similarly, from the IC locus given by
(12), limQ→∞ δRIC = B.I f B<1, then from (23) we know QIC ≤ QSM and there
exists a loanable funds equilibrium. Since the SM locus must cross the IC locus, we







or, Γ(A − 1) + 1 >B
or, [
r + δ + µ
2(r + δ)+µ




or, r[(A − 1) − 2(1 − θ)] < (1 − θ)[2δ + µ]( A 2 )
Since the right-hand side of (23) is non-positive and the right-hand side is strictly
positive, this condition holds. Thus, there is a unique credit rationing equilibrium
where the SM locus intersects the IC locus (Case II).
23(iii) Consider the case where (A − 1) > 2(1 − θ). Solving for r in (23) gives,
r<
(1 − θ)(2δ + µ)
(A − 1) − 2(1 − θ)
≡ r>0
This condition is suﬃcient to guarantee that limQ→∞ δRSM > limQ→∞ δRIC and
the existence of a credit rationing equilibrium (Case II). However, if r ≥ r,t h e n
limQ→∞ δRSM ≤ limQ→∞ δRIC and every loan contract along the SM locus is incentive
compatible. The incentive compatibility constraint does not bind in this case and
there is no rationing (Case I). ¤
Measures of Credit Market Tightness
An alternative measure of credit market tightness is given by the ratio of unmatched


























≡ κ(τ)( A 3 )
From (23), it is easily veriﬁed that κ is monotonically increasing in τ.
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26Figure 1: Optimal Incentive Compatible Loan Contract (Q = Tq and *R)
Case I:   and    Case II:    and   
           or   
Case III: 
Notes: There are three cases, depending on the relative position of the SM and IC loci:
1. Case I incentive compatibility constraint never binds;
2. Case II incentive compatibility constraint binds only when funds available are high and
in that case, the amount of loan is rationed;
3. Case III   optimal incentive compatible loan contract does not exist. Figure 2: Steady-State Loanable Funds Equilibrium
Figure 3: Equilibrium Responses to a Reduction in Search Frictions (Higher  m0)